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JUSTICE DOUGLAS AFTER FIFTY YEARS:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
McCARTHYISM AND RIGHTS
L.A. Powe, Jr.*
Fifty years ago, when Franklin Roosevelt elevated William 0.
Douglas to the Supreme Court, the Court was rapidly dismantling
the constitutional protection of all economic rights. The battle over
Lochner was coming to an end because the one thing that united all
New Deal Justices was the belief that legislatures had to be free to
seek a better and fairer economic environment. Douglas fully concurred; indeed, the majority of the major cases withdrawing judicial
scrutiny from economic transactions bear his name. 1
The end of one jurisprudential battle typically marks the beginning of the next. With New Dealers firmly in control of the judicial
power, the Justices split over how to use it. Just as modern politicians have tried to apply the lessons of Vietnam, the New Deal Justices were determined to apply the lessons of Lochner. But, again as
with Vietnam, different people drew different lessons. One faction,
rallying behind Felix Frankfurter, found the lesson to be the evils of
judicial activism. The lesson translated into a jurisprudence emphasizing procedural regularity on one hand and deference to legislative action on the other. For another faction, the lesson of Lochner
was the error of protecting economic rights. This simple lesson had
an equally simple solution: cease protecting the wrong rights.
Thereafter the Court could protect its own special constituency
groups-blacks, labor, urbanites-as it thought fit.z
During the 1950s and early 1960s a new jurisprudence emerged
at Harvard largely tracking the Frankfurter position. Although ultimately unsuccessful in holding back the Warren Court, the
* Bernard J. Ward Centennial Professor of Law. University of Texas. I would like to
thank my colleagues Jack Getman, Doug Laycock. and Sandy Levinson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I. 313 U.S. 236 (1941); 336 U.S. 106 (1949); 342 U.S. 421 (1952); 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
2. Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger in THE NEW AMERICAr-;
PO!.ITICAL SYSTEM 179, 188-94 (A. King ed. 1978); Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court.
the Commentators and the Search for Values in THE BL:RGER COLRT 218, 218-20 (V. Blasi
ed. 1983); Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275 (1989).
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Harvard jurisprudence had an important impact on legal elites and
therefore on the legitimacy of the judicial product.
Today, in the continuing debate about the Warren Court legacy, the battle over rights has reemerged again. The Federalist Society looks to undoing the Warren Court initiatives by adopting a
Frankfurterian-like view and freeing legislative bodies from most, if
not all, restraints. On the left, the dominant elite strain of the Critical Legal Studies movement rejects the rights-based jurisprudence
associated with Douglas and the Warren Court.J In between, liberal scholars search from moral philosophy to civic republicanism
to define the appropriate scope of constitutional rights. 4
By longevity and behavior, Douglas's career uniquely spans
these battles. He progressed from a mainstream New Deal liberal
to anti-establishment hero, and in the process he spoke to each of
the rights' debates. Although his opinions in Skinner, Griswold,
and Roe v. Wade assist significantly those who would create constitutional rights on the basis of moral philosophy, it is the first
amendment where Douglas contributed most to the idea of judicial
protection of rights. Writing in the New York Times on Douglas's
retirement, Anthony Lewis aptly observed: "Freedom of thought
and expression was his best known theme as a judge. "s It is also a
theme that, set in the context of the debate over rights, illustrates
Douglas's significance as a Justice.
I

Years ago, on the occasion of his thirty-fifth anniversary of appointment to the Supreme Court, I wrote an article entitled Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment 6 in an
attempt to correct the then-prevailing view (promoted by Douglas
himself) that Douglas had always been at the frontiers of first
amendment protection. Douglas joined the Court as a mainstream
New Deal liberal quite content to work within Holmes's clear and
present danger test. But with the beginning of McCarthyism,
3. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1982); Levinson, Book Review, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466, 1468-69 (1983)
(reviewing THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982)).
4. Frank Michelman, the only person who has written a pair of Supreme Court Forewords, has devoted one to each of the theories: Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7 (1969); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
5. Lewis, Mr. Douglas: 36 Years Out on the Frontier. N.Y. Times, Sun. Nov. 16, 1975
(Week in Review), at 2, col. 4.
6. 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371 (1974).
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Douglas began a progression that eventually led to his mislabeled
liberal absolutism.
Because such progressions do not "just" happen, my other goal
was to identify the causes of his leftward evolution. I suggested that
one was the passing from the scene of his patron FDR; another was
his summer travels in the third world; and a final one was experience simpliciter which by the mid-1950s caused him to believe that
restrictions on speech were invariably motivated by fear, or worse,
and were virtually per se unconstitutional. I omitted one other factor: Understandably, if not entirely commendably, I pulled my
punches and failed to attribute part of the evolution to the waning
of Douglas's presidential ambitions. Without that shift, Douglas's
place in the history of the Court would be more open to doubt.
On the same occasion, Thomas Emerson concluded that Douglas made a major theoretical contribution-indeed a "totally new
dimension" 7-to freedom of expression with his emphasis on individual fulfillment as one of the cornerstone values protected. In like
vein Vincent Blasi was able to find the single best example of his
checking value theory in a Douglas opinion.s Nevertheless, it was
for others-the Emersons, the Blasis, the Meiklejohns-to piece together the theoretical structures of the first amendment. Douglas's
opinions would naturally be helpful, but as William Cohen so accurately notes, Douglas was a pragmatist; he left theory building to
others.9
Stated bluntly, Douglas's doctrinal contributions are not impressive. Nor is it a matter of passage of time, the normal fading of
an ex-Justice. Douglas's many critics, both while he was sitting and
afterwards, were right. His opinions were not models; they appear
to be hastily written; and they are easy to ignore. For those of us
who think Douglas was correct in his results and instincts, this is
too bad.
The reasons for his doctrinal insignificance are not news to
anyone: one was legal realism and the other, by no means unrelated, was his contempt for what he saw as the legal establishment-the Harvard Law School and its law review alumni
association functioning as the American Law Institute. So long as
he perceived that the criticisms of his opinions came from a conservative legal establishment, he did not care. His pejorative referEmerson, Justice Douglas' Comribution to the Law: The First Amendment, 74
L REv. 353. 356 (1974).
8. Blasi. The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND. REs.
J. 521, 621.
9.
Cohen, William 0. Douglas, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITCTIOr-i
579, 580 (L. Levy ed. 1986).

7.

CoLUM.
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ence to doctrinal argument in Supreme Court opinions as "Harvard
fly paper" expresses the contempt he felt for his critics.1o
Douglas drank at the well of legal realism too long and too
thoroughly. With the other founders of the movement he stripped
away the silly doctrinal shrouds that marked legal activities. In the
process he concluded that doctrine was irrelevant, the explanatory
cloak for decisions reached on more significant grounds. Whether
the subject was business law (his academic specialty at Yale) or the
rapid dismantling of the constitutional superstructure of the Lochner Era, Douglas did not-indeed he could not-take doctrine
seriously.
Perhaps he was right not to take doctrine seriously, but as G.
Edward White notes, this may have been an insight too fundamental and vastly too unsettling for others to accept. 11 Thus he failed to
appreciate that others, including those not wedded to the judicial
conservatism of Harvard, did take doctrine seriously.12 With his
acknowledged abilities he could have played the doctrinal game superbly, but he saw doctrine as a waste of time and he had non-legal
activities that were more pressing than authoring rationalizations
for those silly enough to believe them.
Douglas, the legal realist, turns out not to have been much of a
judicial realist. He had to know that almost everyone else believed
doctrine to have a part in the legal system. By wholly eschewing
doctrine, he not only suffered a loss of professional esteem, he suffered a loss of influence. It is not easy to explain why a man of such
remarkable abilities would voluntarily do this, and nothing he has
said offers help.
My own view is that he was the quintessential executive. He
believed in and exemplified efficiency; he knew how to make decisions, even tough ones. As Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission he once remarked: "It's goddamn lonely in the
front-line trenches these days." u One of his most hostile critics,
former Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold, recognized Douglas as a
"great and active [New Deal] administrator." 14 The problem was,
as White notes, that the executive strengths that propelled his mete10. /d. at 580.
II. White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality,
74 VA. L. REV. 17, 84 (1988).
12. Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "NaturalLaw-Due-Process Formula", 16 UCLA L. REV. 716, 749 (1969): "As one who has previously
expressed mild dismay at the way Justice Douglas writes his opinions, let me say that I
understand better now. Having said that I confess that I still yearn for a little more explanation ... you can take the boy out of Harvard Law School. but .... "
13. Rodell, Bill Douglas, American, 61 AM. MERCCRY 656, 665 (1945).
14. Griswold, Foreword to B. WOLFMAN, DISSENT WITHOliT 0PI1'10N xii (1975).

1989]

JUSTICE DOUGLAS

271

oric rise, were not judicial strengths, with a single exception, to be
discussed at length in the next section: the willingness to stand up
and be counted when doing so had obvious costs and seemingly few
benefits.
Douglas was a man of action, not reflection. He wrote his dissents before the author of the majority had put pen to paper; he
chafed while waiting for the Chief Justices to assign majorities; he
began writing his own instantly-! mean that literally not figuratively-on receipt of an assignment.'s In a large, unfortunate sense,
Douglas was miscast in the judiciary. Although elevation to the
Supreme Court seems the appropriate reward for a president to bestow on an outstanding lawyer, in Douglas's case higher executive
office would have better suited his abilities. He was temperamentally incapable of functioning within the contemplative world of the
mid-twentieth century judiciary.
If legal realism was Douglas's undoing when it came to doctrine, it turned out to be his strength in casting his vote. The sine
qua non of legal realism was the belief that doctrine obscured more
than it explained about why a court decided as it did. Thereafter,
legal realists split into a variety of approaches to the law.
Douglas was a functionalist. While at Yale he remade the
teaching of corporate law by focusing on how corporations behaved. He believed, in what now seems an obvious point, that if
you did not understand what corporations were doing and why they
were doing it, you had no chance of successfully regulating their
behavior. He studied political, economic, and social institutions in
which law and business intersected to better understand contemporary problems. As part of his study he turned to the fledgling empirical social sciences for whatever assistance they would yield. The
same held true when he went to the New Deal and from there to the
Court.
Any Justice who successfully searches out the underlying facts
of litigation will be rewarded. But as important as facts are generally, nowhere are they as crucial as in the first amendment area.
Difficult cases often turn on determinations of dangerousness, and
any mistake made by miscalculating or overemphasizing the danger
turns what should be constitutionally protected activity into criminal conduct. Furthermore, as Douglas recognized, speech is often
fragile; self-censorship comes too easily. A mistaken conviction of a
dissenter may not only silence him but many others as well, who
now have reason to fear similar police action against themselves.
15.

Powe, Mr. Jusrice Douglas. 55 WASH. L. REV. 285, 286 (1980).
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Douglas saw no inherent limits on where he could look for
facts. First came the record-what happened and why. But this
would hardly set him apart from either a Brennan or a Harlan.
Vastly more important in the first amendment was Douglas's sensitive antennae for the preconditions for freedom of speech. Emerson
aptly singled out Douglas's "remarkable ability to grasp the realities
of the system of freedom of expression ... understand[ing) the apparatus of repression."t6
Consider Douglas's separate opinion in Keith. At issue was the
constitutionality of the Nixon Administration's domestic national
security wiretapping. While the Court agreed with Douglas, he
went far beyond his brethren in describing the domestic climate:
[W]e are currently in the throes of another national seizure of paranoia, resembling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Palmer Raids,
and the McCarthy era. Those who register dissent or who petition their governments for redress are subjected to scrutiny by grand juries, by the FBI, and even by
the military. Their associates are interrogated. Their homes are bugged and their
telephones are wiretapped. They are befriended by secret government informers.
Their patriotism and loyalty are questioned.17

What is striking, even at this distance, is that this wholly unjudicial
and seemingly injudicious blast is so accurate in describing the
Nixon administration. Yet Douglas's opinion was delivered a
month before the Watergate break-in and therefore before any public revelation of Nixon's encroachment on civil liberties. Douglas's
Keith opinion demonstrated his comprehension of what was really
happening in America.
II

Keith, of course, harkens back to Dennis and the McCarthy
Era when Douglas made his major jurisprudential contribution:
demonstrating for all to see-and many to condemn-that a Justice
could defend civil liberties during crisis times. Such action had
neither a long nor distinguished lineage. It last had been seriously
attempted by a discredited Roger Taney acting as a visible fifth column on behalf of the Southern cause during the Civil War.
Furthermore, as I will soon discuss, the prevailing legal theory
was that it could not and should not be done; judges should intervene only when government actions were manifestly unreasonable.
The Japanese exclusion cases ts (the principal case written by Black,
16. Emerson, supra note 7, at 354.
17. 407 U.S. 297, 329-31 (1972).
18. Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214 (1944): Hirayabashi v. United States, 320
u.s. 81 (1943).
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joined by Douglas) demonstrate how circumscribed a class "unreasonable" can be, especially in times of great national stress. By going against the grain during the McCarthy Era, Douglas (and for
this part of the article everything said about Douglas applies virtually equally to Black) suffered a professional loss of reputation, but
also helped discredit the prevailing ideology, although realistically
in the first amendment area the ideology self-destructed in a series
of cases beginning in 1959.
Dennis, charging the Communist Party leadership as a seditious conspiracy, is the key case of the McCarthy Era. If hysteria
were ever justified by unanticipated events, it was justified by the
events between the Dennis indictment in July, 1948, through trial
and conviction, which took almost all of 1949, to the two appellate
affirmances in 1950 and 1951: the Berlin blockade (1948); Chiang
Kai-shek fleeing from Mainland China ( 1949); the first Soviet atom
bomb (1949); Klaus Fuchs' confession (1950); Chinese intervention
as MacArthur approached the Yalu (1950); and the indictment
(1950) and conviction of the Rosen bergs (1951 ). Frankfurter put
the case into this perspective in his concurring opinion when reflecting on the appropriate judicial function: "History teaches that the
independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become
embroiled in the passions of the day .... "1 9 One way or another all
but Black and Douglas agreed with Frankfurter that the Smith Act
could be validly applied to the leaders of the Communist Party in
the circumstances of post-War America.
Douglas summarized the majority vote acidly. "Only those
held by fear and panic could think" that the Communist Party was
an internal menace.zo As he and Black would be called upon to
note with unfortunate regularity, the methods of a communist state
were used to fight internal communism. Thus Douglas quoted
Vishinsky's The Law of the Soviet State for the proposition that
there could be no freedom of speech for foes to socialism and added
that "[o]ur concern should be that we accept no such standard for
the United States. "z 1
With Dennis the decapitation of the Communist Party leadership was complete, as was the constitutional validation of the government program. Unions were purged with the assistance of
§ 9(h) of Taft-Hartley,n and government employees fell victim to
the Federal Loyalty-Security Program (sustained in Bailey v. Rich19.
20.
21.
22.

Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951 ).
!d. at 589.
/d. at 591.
American Communication Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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ardson)23 which relied heavily on the Attorney General's List basically sustained a few weeks prior to Dennis in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath.24 The issues that remained to be
decided were: ( 1) did the first amendment place any limits on the
new type of legislative investigation that HUAC was pioneering;
(2) was it relevant that a person joined the Communist Party for
political rather than revolutionary reasons; and (3) would the parallel state loyalty-security program receive a like imprimatur to that
of Bailey v. Richardson? The first of these questions would wait
until the end of the decade and the settling of the constitutionality
of Southern segregation. The latter two were ready for resolution
almost immediately, the membership problem being presented in
the context of exiling long-term resident aliens.
In 1939 the Court had held on statutory grounds that an alien
who had resigned from the Communist Party could not be deported
based on past discontinued membership simpliciter.2s Congress responded with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 by making it clear
that membership in an organization committed to the overthrow of
the government was sufficient ground for deportation. The Act was
unmistakably retroactive: membership may have been legal; it may
have been innocent; it may even have been terminated prior to the
Act; none of that was relevant. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy26 the
Court sustained the Act on facts showing (in at least one case) that
membership was innocent, triggered by a specific injustice the Party
was protesting at the time.
When Congress passed the infamous McCarran Act in 1950,
one provision relieved the Government of even the necessity of
proving the Communist Party believed in the overthrow of the government; the Act made past membership in the Party grounds for
deportation. Intentionally or not, the Act reached membership
during World War II when the Party actively supported
Roosevelt's wartime policies and was urging cooperation. In Galvan v. Press 27 the Court sustained deportation of an alien who, having lived and worked (and married) in the United States for thirty
years, had the misfortune of joining the Party during the War, even
though he ceased membership in 1946, some four years before the
McCarran Act was passed. Douglas and Black were able to use the
retroactive harshness of the statutes as well as the appalling facts to
dissent effectively, even in the face of a long-standing rule of com23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

341 U.S. 918 (1951).
341 U.S. 123 (1950).
Kessler'· Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
342 U.S. 580 (1952).
347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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plete congressional power. The majority's sole response to the
hardship and injustice was to note that others had suffered hardships; after all, the Japanese exclusion cases showed we could treat
citizens badly too.zs And the fact is that Douglas and Black dissented alone; aliens remained an easy target for majoritarian wrath
and xenophobia.
Two cases sustaining facets of New York's loyalty-security
program showed nuanced distinctions were not of great interest to
the majority of the Court. Adler29 brought to the Court the Feinberg Law with its prima facie presumption that membership in a
listed organization was grounds for taking a teacher out of a classroom. Resting on the right-privilege distinction-it is after all a
privilege not a right, to teach our young-and embracing guilt by
association as no other case ever did, Adler sustained the law in its
preenforcement stage. Frankfurter, in dissent, wished to wait and
see how listing and then allowing a teacher to explain membership
would operate in practice. The other eight knew, although only
Douglas and Black thought that important first amendment
rights-not to mention careers-would be sacrificed.
More than a hint of how the Feinberg Law would operate
came when New York stripped Dr. Edward Barsky of his right to
practice medicine for six months because he had been convicted of
failing to turn over to the HUAC the subpoenaed papers of the
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, an organization he had
joined after he returned from treating the Loyalists wounded during
the Spanish Civil War. Everyone agreed Barsky was fully competent to practice medicine. But of course that was not the point:
fully competent Communists and fellow travellers were being denied employment across the nation; that was the whole point of the
loyalty-security programs. Douglas closed with another plea:
"When a doctor cannot save lives in America because he is opposed
to Franco in Spain, it is time to call a halt and look critically at the
neurosis that has possessed us." Jo
And in fact, largely on technical, nonconstitutional grounds
the Court began to do so for several years beginning in 1955,
thereby alleviating in individual cases the hardships inflicted. Not
until the end of the decade would the major constitutional issues
return. But before looking at how later cases affected perceptions of
the judicial role, it is necessary to discuss the legal ideology that
came to the fore in the 1950s.
28.
29.
30.

Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591.
342 u.s. 485 (1952).
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 474 (1954).
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III
The creative energy of the realist movement made Yale the
dominant intellectual force in American law. But faculty losses to
government service and private practice and the desire for a Rule of
Law-not to mention the more immediate problem of distinguishing the American judicial system from European totalitarianismplaced such strains on realism that the intellectual mantle of American law returned to Harvard. Just as Yale had been the place to be
in the 1930s, Harvard became the place in the 1950s.JI There, a
generation of scholars firmly committed to the legitimacy of both
the New Deal and the Rule of Law struggled to create a new jurisprudence recognizing realist insights but nevertheless striving to
cabin judicial discretion in ways consistent with democratic
governance.
The new process jurisprudenceJL-as announced in a series of
articles throughout the decade in the Harvard Law Review, as well
as two seminal casebooks coauthored by Henry Hart, had an intriguing process formulation.JJ First and foremost it stressed the
reasoning process used by judges to reach and explain results. By
1959, separate articles by Hart and one of his co-authors, Herbert
Weschler, had sharpened this demand. They saw the Supreme
Court as engaged in a collective reasoning process, achieving the
correct result by a mature judgment that would then be explained in
an opinion written so that all readers could see that the relevant
considerations had been vented fully.J 4 Because judges were necessarily not the predominant lawgivers when significant, rather than
interstitial, choices were to be made, it was essential that they give
due deference to what had gone before. Respect for doctrine became primary.
Beyond, but a necessary part of, its doctrinal emphasis, the
new jurisprudence would further limit discretion by institutional allocation. That is, on issues where other institutions have superior
knowledge or fact-finding abilities, judges should defer. The judici3 I. So much so, that much to Douglas's dismay Yale appeared to play catch up by
appointing a Harvard graduate as dean and hiring Harvard-trained Frankfurter clerks for the
faculty. J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WH.LIAM 0. DOUGLAS 337-38
(1980).
32. I have taken the term from G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICA1' JUDICIAL TRADITION:
PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (1976); White, From Rea/ism to Critical Legal
Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 827 (1986).
33. H. HART & H. WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1953); H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
34. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959).
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ary did not have to "roll over and die," but simply recognize as
Stone had said in 1936 that judges are not the only actors who have
the capacity to govern. Much of the judicial function would be process oriented: insuring that institutions maintain procedural regularity and choosing the institution best suited for deciding the
question at hand. The central allocational fact in constitutional adjudication was that the judiciary was the inappropriate institution
when the issues were political, that is, when the outcome "depended
on a choice to interpret the social world in one way rather than
another."Js Thus a deference to the outcomes of the democratic
process was an inherent facet of the new jurisprudence.
Because the new jurisprudence was the creation of New Dealers, there was no necessary reason why Black and Douglas should
have fallen outside its pale. But its demands pushed in directions
Black and Douglas could not go even if they had wished. A demand for deference to various decision-makers, be they the president, Congress, state legislators, HUAC, or the Board of Regents in
New York, could not be squared with what Black and Douglas felt
was their duty to defer to the Constitution. Recognizing the superior competence of HUAC to ascertain the needs to invade political
associations did not seem to them to be particularly apt.
Surprisingly, the Harvard scholarship of the 1950s did not
touch the communist cases. 3 6 For example, consider the monumental attempt of Hart and Sacks "to describe American law comprehensively, including all of its major institutional settings and
accounting for the various permutations of interrelationships between institutions. "3 7 Their casebook about public law and private
ordering avoided issues of constitutional law. Its table of contents
reflects areas where constitutional law might intrude, but these are
undeveloped. Thus its table of contents has a section on legislative
investigations. But when the reader gets to that section in the tenta35. Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s. 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 594-605 (!988).
36. An important exception was Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold's timely publication of
three speeches defending the right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination before
legislative committees. E. GRISWOLD. THE FIF-TH AMENDMENT TODAY (!955). The
speeches had two principal points: ( l) that an innocent person could feel the need to claim
the fifth; and (2) that the legislature had the responsibility to more actively supervise and
regularize the investigating committee behavior, especially when a sub-committee consisted
of a single member sitting. The volume called for no judicial changes in settled law and
reflected strongly the process empha,is of the new jurisprudence. Interestingly, Griswold
recognized that t·he fifth was often being taken because of the first. id. at 60-6!. but did not trv
to discuss the issue in first amendment terms. an important, and correct. tactical choice give~
the currency then of the pejorative "Fifth Amendment Communists." When it did come
time to consider the first, however, Griswold was nowhere near so solicitous. See Griswold,
Absolutes in the Dark. 8 UTAH L. REv. 167 (1963). and text at notes 49-53.
37. Peller, supra note 35, at 591-92.
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tive edition, the authors note it "will not be developed in this
edition." 3s
The scholarly focus, and not only that of Hart and Sacks, was
on other areas where Black and Douglas were not as far apart from
their brethren. But that did not help the reputations of either
Douglas or Black for several reasons.39 One was Frankfurter, who
helped create process jurisprudence and in turn for whom process
jurisprudence was made. He had been a friend and colleague and
teacher of some of its creators; others had served apprenticeships as
his law clerks. His energy and magnetic personality made him the
role model that all should follow.40 At Harvard Law School he was
perceived as precisely what a judge should be: intelligent, undogmatic, disinterested, but passionate. He excelled in those areas
where judicial creativity was called for, but understood fully the
necessity of deference to democratic institutions when value-laden
decisions were at issue. A belief flourished that Frankfurter-"Our
Felix" as he was known at Harvard Law School-was a shining
light of Western jurisprudence. It did not take a Harvard education
to see that he was voting differently in the first amendment McCarthy Era cases than Black and Douglas.4I
Process jurisprudence spread less through scholarship-no one
could accuse the Harvard constitutional law faculty of that era of
being prolific-than by word of mouth. Process jurisprudence also
took time, at least fifteen years, to mature. Thus not everyone at
Harvard adhered to it and the accretion of its tenets was uneven.
But a basic rallying point was that Black and especially Douglas
were not of the caliber to be taken seriously as judges. One law
professor who was a Harvard Law School 1950s LL.B. and an early
1960s teaching fellow, described an overwhelming ambience of real
hostility to Douglas and Black; conversely, a president of the
38. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 33, at 1037.
39. Obviously I was not at Harvard during the period under discussion. In putting this
together I have relied on what was written and an oral tradition. As to the latter, as a former
Douglas clerk, during my early years in teaching, I was regaled by stories of the way Harvard
professors would take pot shots at Douglas. I could remember the attitude, if not the story or
the story teller. In writing this I have talked to a number of law professors who were at
Harvard during the period and then given each of them my draft with the express injunction
to correct me in any ways necessary. Those I have consulted include Vern Countryman,
Norman Dorsen, Jack Getman, George Schatzki. Ernest Smith, and Russell Weintraub.
What appears in text is the outgrowth of this process although the final choice of language
and emphasis was, of course, mine. See also, Dorsen. Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 367,
385 & n.lOl (1981).
40. "To Felix Frankfurter who first opened our minds to these problems" is the Dedication in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 33, at ix.
41. It was well known, of course, what Frankfurter thought of Black and Douglas. See
Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethern. 1988 Dt.:KE L.J. 71.
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Harvard Law Review described it as a generally accepted dogma
that Frankfurter was right on issues of constitutional law. Wherever Harvard graduates taught or practiced law, Frankfurter was
praised while Black and Douglas were treated with scorn and contempt. Their votes, their analyses, were simply not the workings of
"first-rate lawyers."42
In his forthcoming book about American legal education, my
colleague Jack Getman (Harvard Law School '58) writes of going to
Harvard after City College of New York and a two-year military
enlistment, with Douglas and Black as his legal heroes. But he soon
discovered that they "turned out to be woefully deficient in all ...
technical professional ways." 4J Getman wryly summed it up: "One
of the things that makes you proudest of a Harvard legal education
is that you can explain why Douglas is wrong."44
I have been told of one Harvard Law Review officer who was
selected as one of Black's law clerks, an incredible honor given both
the limited number of slots and the stark unevenness of the sitting
Justices. Yet faculty members ridiculed him for being willing to
waste a year of his life working for Black. (There is no comparable
Douglas story because Douglas, to my good fortune, always went
West for law clerks.)
In 1963, the Harvard Law Review commissioned an article by
Yale Professor, and former Black clerk, Charles Reich, to commemorate Black's twenty-fifth anniversary. The resulting article,
Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution,4s is magnificent in
scope and substance, demonstrating Black's commitment and ability to make the eighteenth-century Constitution work in mid-twentieth century America. Yet the 1963 president of the Review reports
that there was "faculty disgruntlement (which we thought narrowly
conceived) about both the subject and the reasoning."46 From the
faculty perspective, what Black (and Douglas) thought and did was
not fit for discussion in the Harvard Law Review, except perhaps as
a subject of ridicule.
IV

The Court, however, was about to reenter the debate and
would do so in a way that would profoundly change perceptions.
42.

The phrase is Hart"s. SeeP. BOBBITT, CONSTITL'TIO~AL FATE: THEORY OF THE
53 (1982).
J. GETMAN. NOTES OF A~ ACADEMIC DISSIDENT (forthcoming).
Getman to author in conversation, October 4, 1988.
Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution. 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 ( 1963).
Kester, Faculty Participation in Student Edited Law Reviews, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 14
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44.
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(1986).
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As the 1960s were about to begin, the Supreme Court had returned
to constitutional issues in communist cases. The major opinions
were written by Harlan (who was perceived to be a weaker, junior
version of Frankfurter), joined by Frankfurter since the analysis followed his Dennis opinion, with Black and Douglas (and now Warren and Brennan) dissenting. These cases resulted in an academic
debate where it became apparent, as Duncan Kennedy's student
note would subsequently point out, that "a number of enthusiastic
'balancers' have also been strong advocates of 'principled' decisionmaking [the process jurisprudence school]."4 7 Once again, however, the adherents of process jurisprudence concluded that Black
and Douglas had been bested.
In dissent, Black and Douglas had argued that the first amendment was an absolute. The majority, by contrast, viewed that claim
as preposterous and held that balancing all the various interests at
stake was the appropriate way of solving the issue. The academic
community accepted the debate on the terms set by the Justices. On
those terms Black and Douglas "had" to be wrong. It was simply
inconceivable that "all" speech was "absolutely" protected under
the Constitution. Numerous counter-examples were possible-and
Harlan supplied them in a single devastating and unanswered footnote4s-and if Black and Douglas believed, for example, that perjury was the exercise of first amendment rights, then they were not
merely wrong; their position was not worthy of discussion.
Harvard's dean, Erwin Griswold, made the point wonderfully when
he recalled a large illuminated sign outside a New Orleans church
which read: "God said it. We believe it. That's all there is to it."
The absolutism of Black and Douglas, he added, "seems a similar
approach. " 49
With Black and Douglas confirming the Harvard view that
they were brain-dead, it was easy to conclude that ad hoc balancing
"had" to be right; law is an exercise of balancing and it ought not
come as a shock to find that that applies to the first amendment as
much as the fourth or fifth. What was not considered was that
Black and Douglas were using "absolutism" as a summation of how
the balance worked out after a decade of deciding cases growing out
of the hysteria.
47. Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 852 n.39
(1969).
48. 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.IO: "That view, which of course cannot be reconciled with the
law relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the like, is said to be compelled
by the fact that the commands of the First Amendment are stated in unqualified terms."
49. Griswold, Absolutes in the Dark, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167, 172 (1963).
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Nor would process jurisprudence allow absolutism to be used
as a rhetorical device to express an attitude about how first amendment adjudication should be approached,so because if absolutism
was rhetorical, it would "gravely ... deprecate and damage the
process" of decision-making which must be "as deliberate and conscious as men can make it."si Both possibilities, rhetorical or sub
silentio summation of experience, were incompatible with the premises of process jurisprudence; furthermore Black and Douglas, by
their willingness to reassess the need for action, were invading the
legislative province. Thus they were taken literally, which, not surprisingly, confirmed existing prejudices.
Nor did process jurisprudence adherents ask whether, in operation, balancing was also a rhetorical cover. In a sense, the majority opinions seemed far more absolutist than Black and Douglas.
The majority was absolutely convinced that no matter what was
placed in the scales to be balanced, when the government was on
the prowl for communists, the balance was always to favor the government. Black and Douglas pointed that out in their dissents, and
Black's dissents powerfully showed how a serious "balancer" would
attempt to deal with the factors. The opinions in Barenblau,s2 Wilkinson,s3 Konigsberg,s4 and Anastapfoss make clear for any who
would read that Black and Douglas were not only right in their
criticism of the balancers' technique, but in the process were validating their positions taken in the earlier cases. These cases, coming when and as they did, would make Douglas and Black heroes to
law students as the decade progressed.
Lloyd Barenblatt had been called before HUAC in 1954 and
was questioned about whether he had been a Party member as a
graduate student at Michigan after World War II. Barenblatt eschewed the fifth and took the first instead. Harlan's majority embraced the competency point of process neutrality by stating that
the Court would not pass judgment on either the wisdom or efficacy
of the activities of HUAC. Instead the Court announced it must
decide the case by "balancing" the "competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." For the
next seven pages the Court discussed the "public interests," i.e.,
those favoring disclosure and then, without mentioning a single pri50.

Charles L. Black, Mr. Justice Black. the Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights,
Feb. 1961, at 63.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 96 (1962).
360 U.S. 109 (1959).
365 U.S. 399 ( 1961 ). The opinion of the Court was written by Stewart.
366 u.s. 36 (I 961 ).
366 u.s. 82 (I 961 ).
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vate interest--or ever considering that the first amendment might
be a "public interest"-it bluntly announced in the penultimate paragraph: "We conclude that the balance between the individual and
the governmental interests here at stake must be struck in favor of
the latter, and that therefore the provisions of the First Amendment
have not been offended."so
Black and Douglas demolished the majority, first by demonstrating that balancing was inappropriate and then by showing that
if the Court really believed balancing was valid, a proper balance
would have resulted in reversal of Barenblatt's conviction. Had the
balancing debate ended here, Barenblatt might have passed as a
somewhat belated validation of HUAC, years after the issue was
relevant. But in several 1961 cases the same majority made clear
that when it said "balance" in the context of any mention of the
"c" -word, it meant that the government was to win no matter what
the facts.
Wilkinson had been a long-time anti-HUAC activist. When
HU AC went to Georgia in the summer of 1958, Wilkinson arrived
a week earlier to assist those protesting the hearings. Within an
hour of his registering at a hotel, he was served with a subpoena to
appear. The essential distinguishing factor from Barenblatt was
that Wilkinson was in Atlanta to protest HUAC and would not
have been forced to appear had he been elsewhere; his "crime" was
protesting HUAC in the late 1950s. Was this relevant? The majority, adhering to its balancing, said no: "the First Amendment
claims pressed here are indistinguishable from those considered in
Barenblatt . ... "s 7
"Indistinguishable" would appear again in Konigsberg and
Anastap/o, decided two months later. In both cases the majority
held that a refusal to answer a Bar committee's question about
membership was grounds for refusing to certify good moral character to become a member of the Bar. In Konigsberg's case there was
some weak evidence of past membership in the party; in Anastaplo's
there was none. He had triggered the inquiry when, in responding
to a request to state the principles underlying the Constitution, he
concluded that "whenever the particular government in power becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter
or abolish it and thereupon to establish a new government." The
Illinois Bar was apparently worried that belief in the principles of
the Declaration of Independence might indicate communist tendencies. For the majority, the reason that the state asked about mem56.
57.

360 U.S. 109. 126, 134 (1958).
365 U.S. 399, 415 (1960) (Black. J., dissenting).
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bership was irrelevant. The state's need to know about any past
party membership so that it could have a Bar dedicated to the highest principles of the law "outweighs any deterrent effect upon" first
amendment rights.ss
Anastaplo's facts are so appealing-his mistake was, as Black
and Douglas accurately noted, that "he took too much of the responsibility of preserving that freedom upon himself"s 9 -that the
injustice was enshrined for everyone to see. Black made it even
clearer with possibly the most moving and powerful opinion in the
pages of the United States Reports. The balancing test "proves pitifully and pathetically inadequate to cope with an invasion of individual liberty so plainly unjustified that even the majority
apparently feels compelled expressly to disclaim 'any view upon the
wisdom of the State's action.' "oo
It is not the result so much as the reasoning, process jurisprudence held, that matters; but maybe the result does matter, especially when it is flagrantly wrong. Deference to other institutions;
refusal to square the premise of those being judged with constitutional norms; logic and doctrine: if these components of process
jurisprudence led to such profound injustices in 1961, seven years
after McCarthy's fall, maybe they sustained earlier injustices. If
Black and Douglas were right in 1961, saying the same things that
they had always said, maybe they were right earlier. Maybe protected first amendment rights against government would not have
brought either the nation or the judiciary to its knees.ot Maybe it
makes sense to stand up for constitutional rights and stand against
injustice even when democratic institutions and the legal establishment argue to the contrary.
A generation of law students coming into law schools in the
58. 366 U.S. at 89.
59. /d. at 114.
60. /d. at Ill.
61. Contrast Alexander Bickel's point that the Court should husband its resources so if
there is a "'coup'' the Court can intervene and restore democracy. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 94. 178 (1970). There is something staggering about
the judiciary intervening-an injunction perhaps 0 -to prevent a coup, so here is the full
quote:
If we should encounter. not malapportionment, not inequality and social injustice
but a coup, an attempt by an inflamed majority or by a powerful elite, broken loose
from other restraints, to proscribe and outlaw one or another group, or to mount a
fundamental assault against broadly-responsive government. might not this unique
American institution just save us"
Reading this quote from the perspective of two decades it might be seen to justify the actions
of Black and Douglas during the McCarthy Era because an "inflamed majority" had "broken
loose" and functionally was "outlawing" a group. This would be more than a bit ironic since
Bickel had nothing but contempt for Black and Douglas and revered Frankfurter. for whom
he had clerked.
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1960s would find those "maybes" unnecessary. When Southern
governments attempted to wrap themselves in the cloak of the
Court's red hunting doctrines to fight civil rights groups, it was impossible to argue plausibly-although Harlan for one sometimes
tried-that neutrality required blacks to lose because reds had lost
earlier. The civil rights litigation provided timely and powerful reinforcement for the positions of Black and Douglas. Moreover,
Black's advancing age and inability to reconcile civil rights demonstrations with first amendment rights, separated the two, to Douglas's overwhelming advantage.
In a remarkable transformation in law schools (decidedly less
so -initially-at Harvard), taking less than a decade, Black and
Douglas went from being objects of scorn to prescient judges who
had understood the hysteria and acted to counter it. Process jurisprudence was not, however, an immediate casualty in this switch.
Just as it took time to develop, so, too, its parts disintegrated over
time. Frankfurter's mythical status was an early victim. So was the
idea of deference; if Douglas and Black had not done enough to
inter it, in the 1960s it became obvious that Southern governments
would be the beneficiaries of any deference.
Although the results sought by Black and Douglas were accepted and validated, their styles, especially Douglas's, were not.
As White demonstrates, there are incredible institutional pressures
for judges to eschew Douglas's realist stance and subsequent Justices have had little trouble doing so.62 Furthermore, process jurisprudence in operation, although not intent, had turned out to be a
conservative doctrine in the sense that its application tended to reinforce the status quo. As the status quo became a liberal one, liberals
could more easily embrace its tenets while conservatives would
wonder why liberal doctrine was entitled to respect simply because
it was there. In the years following their respective departures from
the Court it was not necessary to embrace either Douglas's style or
Black's jurisprudence to justify liberalism. Douglas and Black were
right, and they showed that by being willing to stand for what was
right; men, lawyers, yes, maybe even the Law, can do what is right.

v
With Frankfurter off the Court, thereby saving himself and the
NAACP from his disgraceful fifth vote to allow Florida to save the
NAACP from internal communism in Gibson, 6 3 a firm majority ex62.
63.

White, supra note II, at 77-86.
B. ScHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 452-53 (1983) recounts the five-four vote against the
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isted to implement most positions that Black and Douglas voted
for. No longer was it an open question whether the Constitution
would be actively enforced to protect individual liberties. At issue
was only to what lengths the majority was willing to go. Although
both Black and Douglas lived to see majorities holding to their
views, Douglas again moved to dissenter and began to stake out
positions for the next generation of liberal judges-a generation that
never came because the era of liberal dominance of the presidency
had ended.
Unlike Black in his twilight, Douglas found a new constituency, the nation's youth. At a time when "never trust anyone over
thirty" was a popular motto, Douglas achieved the status of a folk
hero. His positions on the environment and civil liberties resonated
with the views of youth. In Points of Rebellion he explicitly embraced their anti-establishment views and tweaked his contemporaries by referring to the Establishment as the new George III,
implicitly suggesting that revolutionary change would be a good
idea.
The battles that Douglas and Black fought in the McCarthy
Era were formally "won": a new consensus emerged recognizing
the importance of an independent judiciary willing to sustain political dissent and essential personal liberties. By the Constitution's
Bicentennial, a superbly credentialed federal judge, Robert Bork,
who had tantalizing if unexplored jurisprudential affinities with
both Holmes and Black, but definitely not Douglas, was denied confirmation to the Supreme Court in large part because he appeared to
reject the idea of judicial enforcement of civil liberties.
Yet even as the new consensus that Black and Douglas helped
pioneer has achieved amazing breadth, it has splintered and been
attacked. Within the academic community, Bork would be identified with The Federalist Society and the conservative reaction to the
Warren Court jurisprudence. To the left, the emergence of CLS
represents a view of the Warren Court as part of an outmoded conservative status quo, and thus CLS largely rejects the rights-based
liberalism that Douglas championed-although I suspect that many
CLS members counted Douglas as one of their heroes when they
were younger and would identify even today with his stands during
the McCarthy Era.
Douglas's choices during the McCarthy Era were fundamentally different in kind from the Warren Court's dismantling of segregation, rural domination of legislatures, and an antiquated
NAACP at Conference. Whittaker's retirement and Frankfurter's stroke resulted in the case
being reset for oral argument and coming out as it did.
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criminal justice system. In those areas, where the modern debate
about judicial activism began, there was a powerful constituency on
the sidelines applauding the Court and encouraging it to do more to
create a better society. As Martin Shapiro importantly notes, the
Court was protecting the Democratic Party coalition and therefore
its own supporters. 64 That was not the case when the issue was
protecting reds and pinks in the early 1950s. Those who saw the
necessity of protecting civil liberties were, sadly, few and far between. Had other members of the Warren Court majority been on
the Court during the early 1950s they might have performed as
Black and Douglas did. Or they might not have. Warren, for instance, had the opportunity to show how he would vote as late as
1954, and he voted with the majority, not Black and Douglas, in
both Barsky and Galvan v. Press.
What I have suggested provides some basis for a reevaluation
of Douglas's legacy and his importance. No one can erase his cavalier attitude towards doctrine. But, as time passes, any given Justice's contribution to doctrine and judicial craft recedes. To use the
most obvious example, John Marshall has been acclaimed as the
greatest Justice of all time, and yet even first year students are able
to rip gaping holes in the logic of his opinions. His greatness is
entirely divorced from the reasoning of his opinions (Marbury's absurd reasoning being the most blatant) and rests instead on the fact
that he turned the Court into a major and unique institution of
American government.
It may be that only a "founder" is entitled to such an evaluation. Moreover, unlike Douglas, Marshall enjoyed the solid support
of the leaders of the Bar. Nevertheless, Douglas, too, was a
"founder" albeit a different one, a "founder" of a school that holds
that even in the worst of times judges can actually stand up and
demand we adhere to our ideals. Douglas received little credit at
the time from the elites of the profession, but he had a unique credibility with American youth when almost no other politically prominent American had any. There, indeed, his eschewing legalisms and
resting on a blunt moral basis may have proven no small part of his
charm.
When in the future we evaluate Justices, more recognition
ought to be placed on their external influences, for those tend to be
the more lasting. We cannot freeze the law or any given perception
of it. It may well be that a new concept of the function of courts
64. Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM (A. King ed. 1978); Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators and the Search for Values in THE BURGER COURT (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
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will form and replace the liberal consensus that finds individual liberties worthy of judicial protection in the worst of times no less than
in the best of times. Attitudes, like reputations, are not static. But
for over a quarter of a century, thanks in no small part to the courageous stands of Black and Douglas, an ideology of judicial protection of individual liberties has dominated our legal culture as
thoroughly as the Harvard ideology dominated the previous era.
Each generation must decide how it wishes to choose, and Douglas
would have been the last to suggest the dead should govern the living. Yet by one precept, being right on the major issue of his times
when so many others were wrong, he may have assisted future generations in choosing wisely.

